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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 1
Below the shimmering hulls of "The Love Boat"2 and "Fun
Ship"3 lies a murky world that few passengers ever see. Employment-
related maritime torts lurk deep within the bowels of crew quarters,
only to surface years later as the subsequent litigation (or arbitration)
begins to run its course. Both the passenger cruising and marine
shipping industries have experienced exponential growth since the
mid to late twentieth century.4 Despite the well-documented perils of
the high seas5 - and accompanying active docket of maritime law-
suits6 - there is an astounding void in legal scholarship relating to
choice of law provisions in maritime employment contracts. 7
1 The authors would like to acknowledge University of Miami School of Law Dean
Patricia D. White for illuminating a clear path to law teaching and scholarship, J.
Raul Cosio and Alex Gonzalez for inspiring excellence in the practice of law. Yara
Lorenzo for helpful comments, and the dedicated editorial staff of the University of
Miami International and Comparative Law Review for carefully preparing this
article for publication. The opinions expresses in this article are solely those of the
authors and are not necessarily reflective of Holland & Knight, LLP or its affiliates.
2 Sarah J. Tomlinson, Smooth Sailing? Navigating the Sea of Law Applicable to the
Cruise Industry. 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127, 133 n.37 (2007) (citing Lydia
Boyd, Brief History of the Passenger Ship Industry. http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/
adaccess/ship-history.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2009)).3 Id.
4 Profile of the U.S. Cruise Industry. CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.cruising.org/Press/sourcebook2009/profile cruise industry.cfm.
5 See, e.g., Thomas A. Gionis, Comment, Paradox on the High Seas: Evasive
Standards of Aedical Care Duty Without Standards of Care; A Call for the
International Regulation of Maritime Healthcare Aboard Ships, 34 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 751, 764-65 (2001) (discussing an increase in maritime injuries reported to the
U.S. Coast Guard in the last two decades of the twentieth century); see also Sarah J.
Tomlinson, supra note 2, at 128-29 (2007) (noting that even while the only statistics
available for the cruise industry are those that the cruise lines voluntarily report to
the Federal Bureau of Investigations, cruise industry officials estimate that fifty
cruise ship crimes occur each year and an astonishing thirteen people vanish from
ships each year); Sharnelle Samuel Porter. Passenger Protections Will Not Sink the
Cruise-ship Industry, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 597. 597-98 (2006) (providing that,
between 2003 and 2005, twenty-four people were reported missing from cruise
ships, 178 victims complained of sexual assault aboard the high seas, and the FBI
initiated 305 investigations based on crimes that occurred on cruise vessels).
6 See Marva Jo Wyatt. High Crimes on the High Seas: Re-evaluating Cruise Line
Legal Liability. 20 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 147, 147 (2008) ("There are hundreds of cases
v. 17
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court has issued various
opinions on forum selection clauses in maritime torts, 8 these opinions
have done little to inform lower courts regarding the role of choice of
law provisions in maritime employment agreements. As a result,
clumsy and unpredictable multi-factor frameworks continue to
dominate maritime tort choice of law jurisprudence, even as an
increasing number of maritime agreements contain unambiguous
and bargained-for choice of law provisions.9
Modern choice of law principles in general admiralty law are
steeped in tacit approval for the international norms that historically
governed trade between nations and international actors in maritime
commerce. 10 However, the advent of technology has quickly changed
the trade winds that have fueled global shipping and altered the
relevant interests.11 As a result, maritime actors have sought to circ-
that illustrate the perils of sea passage, from the past century, and the one before it..
7 The current literature is largely refined to discussion of the duty of care owed to
passengers and forum selection provisions in the cruise industry. See, e.g., Kristo-
pher E. Pearson. Hope for Temporary Citizens Aboard Floating Cities. Carlisle v.
Carnival Corporation. 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 295 (2005); Linda S. Mullenix, Another
Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal
Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INTL L.J. 323 (1992); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a
Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court,
40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 423 (1992).
8 See, e.g. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 407 U.S. 1 (1991); Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (honoring a forum-selection clause
over argument that the agreement should be invalidated as it was a provision in an
adhesive consumer contract).
9 See, e.g., Lockwood v. M/S Royal Viking Star. 663 F. Supp. 181, 183 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (applying multi-factor maritime tort choice of law framework even though
seafarer's employment contract contained presumptively valid choice of law clause).
10 B. Otis Felder. Unifying Choice-of-Law Rules and Their Effects on Maritime
Remedies, 11 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 213, 221, 227 (1998).
11 See Sara Dillon, A Farewell to "Linkage": International Trade Law and Global
Sustainability Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 87, 91 n.12 (2002) ("Most scholars
agree that a distinction between internationalization and globalization is that the
latter is impelled by the exponential increase in flows of information across national
boundaries occasioned by information technology. If the international era was
characterized by the liberalization of trade in goods and multilateral cooperation
achieved through national and supranational political processes, globalization is
denoted almost singularly by its minimization of the role and importance of
territorial boundaries and the resulting implications for sovereignty."), see generally
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umvent unpredictable multi-factor interest analyses by including
provisions in commercial agreements that purport to select the appli-
cable governing law. This article focuses on the role of these
provisions in the maritime tort setting. In particular, we focus on the
enforceability of choice of law clauses in maritime employment
agreements entered into between parties of differing allegiances.
Should U.S. admiralty law govern maritime tort claims where the
employment agreement stipulates that foreign law will apply, or
should the bargained-for choice of law provision supersede the
common law choice of law analysis? Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's proclamations in Bremen and Shute encouraging the enforce-
ability of forum selection clauses in maritime agreements, many
questions remain unanswered as to the validity of choice of law pro-
visions in maritime tort cases.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the
applicable domestic and international maritime laws to set the back-
ground. Part III describes the history of maritime tort choice of law
analyses. Part IV relates the current state of choice of law provisions
in the admiralty context. Part V speaks to drafting for naught: the
(in)significance of choice of law clauses in maritime torts. Part VI
presents the role of choice of law provisions in maritime torts post-
Bremen and charts the course for the future of choice of law
provisions.
II. THE VIEW FROM THE CROW'S NEST:
UNWRAPPING CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS
A fallacy in legal thought leads many practitioners to the false
notion that a ship is merely a floating portion of the country under
which the vessel flies its flag.12 To the contrary, the complex web of
laws governing the maritime industry is governed largely by inter-
national law and self-regulation. 13 Even in the face of a multi-billion
Alastair J. Walling. Early to Bed, Early to Rise, Work Like Hell and Globalie, 13
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 161 (2004) (discussing the import of technology to the rapid
pace of globalization).
12 Felder, supra note 10, at 222.
13 See Tomlinson, supra note 2, at 134 (citing International Maritime Organization,
Introduction to IMO, http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic id=3 (provid-
ing an overview of International Maritime Organization's history and purposes and
informing that the United Nations established it through convention)). In fact, the
v. 17
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dollar cruise industry,14 there is a surprising paucity of consistent
choice of law jurisprudence to guide the industry.1 5
There are advantages and pitfalls to enforcing choice of law
provisions. 16 The primary benefit is that agreements between parties
foment efficiency by reducing the uncertainty of default conflicts
rules and enable parties to avoid expensive litigation stemming from
the application of inefficient and unpredictable choice of law
frameworks. 17
United States is a party or signatory to over a dozen conventions governing
admiralty law. Felder, supra note 10, at 223 n.45 (citing the following statutes to
which the United States is a party: Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 17,
1960, 16 U.S.T. 185, 536 U.N.T.S. 27; Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
Nov. 1. 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278; International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327
U.N.T.S. 3. as amended Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, 600 U.N.T.S. 332 and Oct.
21, 1969, 28 U.S.T. 1205, T.I.A.S. No. 8505; International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969,
26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, and Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances Other than Oil. Nov. 2, 1973, T.I.A.S. No.
10561; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, and Protocol
of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships. 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546; Convention on Facilitation of
International Maritime Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, 18 U.S.T. 411, 591 U.N.T.S. 265;
International Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, 640
U.N.T.S. 133, Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the International Convention on
Load Lines, Jan. 30, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 17, T.I.A.S. No. 6629, and Proces-Verbal of
Rectification of the International Convention on Load Lines, May 5. 1969, 20 U.S.T.
2577, T.I.A.S. No. 6720; Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587).
14 See, e.g., ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUSES. LTD., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2008).
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzMy
OTgxfENoaWxkSUQ9MzE2MzcxfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=I (showing $6.5 billion in
total revenues); CARNIVAL CORP. & PLC, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2008), available
at http: //library.corporate-ir.net/library/ 14/140/140690/items/3 27186/640EC6CE-AF
08-40EF-8827-93964454BB34 Carnival%20Corp%202008%20AR.pdf (showing
$14.6 billion in total revenues).
15 See Felder, supra note 10, at 234-36.
16 See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 4-22 (1963) (arguing that choice of law should maximize the interests and
power of individual states).
17 Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37
GA. L. REv. 363, 366 (2003).
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Through much of the twentieth century, the United States
largely adhered to the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and
territorial principles in the enforcement of rights and duties arising
from a contract.18 Under these principles, a court could only regulate
people and events within the borders of its jurisdiction. 19 Joseph
Beale, the reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, set
forth the "vested rights" rationale and accompanying rules that
separated the territorial boundaries of a state's lawmaking author-
ity.20 Under the Restatement, a dispute with connections to multiple
jurisdictions would be adjudicated pursuant to the laws of the juris-
diction where the rights became "vested," which was generally the
location of the last act or event necessary to create the dispute.21
Today, most courts have adopted section 187 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which uses the choice of law
agreed to between the parties as the first step in determining the law
applicable to resolving a given dispute.22 Most scholars agree that
such an approach is sensible and efficient, allowing the parties to
determine, at low cost and ex ante, that certain given conduct will
18 Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law,
67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1152-53 (2000).
19 See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.2
(1935); Ernest G. Lorenzen. Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Lfaw,
30 YALE L.J. 655, 658 (1921).
20 O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1152.
21 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,. § 187 (1971) ("(1) The law of the
state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue. (2) The law of the state
chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied,
even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either (a) the
chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there
is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or (b) application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. (3) In the absence of a




trigger the application of a particular state's law.23 With full knowl-
edge of the binding agreements as to future litigation, parties can
structure their behavior to avoid laws ill-suited to their affairs while
minimizing the costs of contracting for efficient laws, or avoiding
inefficient ones.24
Before delving into the jurisprudence of maritime choice of
law provisions, we briefly survey several alternative means by which
courts have confronted conflicts when parties seek divergent laws as
governing rules. The traditional approach in the tort setting has
generally been to apply lex loci delicti commissi, i.e., the law of the
jurisdiction in which the injury has occurred.25 This approach affords
parties with uniformity and predictability, as courts can easily deter-
mine the place of injury and apply the law of that jurisdiction. This,
however, may also lead to arbitrary results when the injury occurs in
a pass-through jurisdiction which bears no relation to the parties. 26 In
more factually complex cases, courts can consider where the defend-
ant undertook significant steps that led to the injury or where neglig-
ent action occurred. 27
Another approach is the governmental interest analysis. This
approach allows the court in which the dispute is pending to examine
legislative action to determine those laws viewed as important. 28 The
web of conflict of laws grows more complex when, as often is the
case in the maritime context, the choice of law provisions specify
23 See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1152; see also Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); Erin A. O'Hara, Opting Out of
Regulation. A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1551, 1569 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman. Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90
GEO. L.J. 883, 938 (2002).
24 See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1152.
25 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (defining lex loci
delicti as the law of the place "where the last event necessary to make an actor liable
for an alleged tort takes place").
26 Helen Shin, Oh, I Have Slipped the Surly Bonds of Earth: Multinational Space
Stations and Choice of Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1391 (1990).
27 Id. at 1391 n.79 (citing Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 104-05 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Federal Tort Claims Act focuses on place where negligent or wrongful act or
omission occurred); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 761-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(same)).
28 Id. at 1399 (citing BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 181-82 (1963)).
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laws of states that tend to inhibit a plaintiff's redress to court or limit
recoverable damages. 29
Under the government interest analysis, the court reviews the
reasons for which the legislature passed certain laws so as to deter-
mine the law's underlying policy.30 According to this analysis, the
laws of the forum should be utilized if their application advances the
legislature's policies. 31 A "true conflict" can emerge under Professor
Currie's analysis when more than one jurisdiction maintains a valid
interest in applying its laws to the matter at hand.32 Forums should
mitigate and avoid conflicts of laws whenever possible; 33 however,
the court should apply the substantive law prescribed by the legislat-
ure rather than attempt to size the merits of a particular matter.34
Other approaches exist to resolve conflicts of law. Professor
Luther McDougal proposes the comprehensive interest analysis
model as a means to consider all interests. This analysis creates a
novel corps of law to address concerned parties, including actors and
states not directly involved in the dispute.35 This model is closely
29 See, e.g., Thomas v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 2009 WL 1874098 (11th Cir., July. 1,
2009) (questioning enforceability of agreements in which choice of law and choice
of forum provisions operate as a prospective waiver of statutory rights).
30 See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958); Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions:
Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205
(1958); Alfred Hill. For a Third Conflicts Restatement-But Stop Trying To Reinvent
the Wheel, 75 IND. L.J. 535, 535 (2000) ("Forty-two years ago Brainerd Currie
announced his discovery that the traditional choice-of-law rules are so mired in
technical arbitrariness as to be irrelevant to our economic and social institutions and
shared values-indeed, worse than irrelevant, for to consider the traditional rules
would only obscure the problem. so that the sensible course is to refrain from
examining them for even glimmerings of light, which in any event would not be
found. Currie's demonstration of this point has been accepted as irrefutable both by
those who have followed his prescriptions for interest analysis and those who have
not. Virtually all have agreed that choice-of-law rules, if there are to be such rules,
must be formulated anew.").
31 Shin, supra note 26, at 1399.
32 Id. (citing Brainerd Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 181-82
(1963)).
3 Brainerd Currie. The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
769-72 (1963).
34 Shin, supra note 26, at 1399.
35 See Luther L. McDougal Ill, Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus Reformul-
ated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the Context of Choice-of-Law
v. 17
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associated with policy-oriented theories of jurisprudence. 36 The
comprehensive interest analysis rejects the traditional conflicts of
laws theories, including the vested rights theory, but also unquest-
ionably shuns the modern interest analysis as inadequate.37
III. THE HISTORY OF MARITIME TORT CHOICE
OF LAW ANALYSIS
The importance of maritime commerce is not a novel
phenomenon, as evidenced by the fact that the Founding Fathers
expressly placed admiralty law within the purview of the United
States district courts.38 A few years later, Congress passed the Judic-
iary Act of 1789 pursuant to its Article III mandate.39 The Act codified
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and bestowed upon
them original jurisdiction over "any civil case of admiralty or mari-
time jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to
which they are otherwise entitled."40 Indeed, Congress attempted to
create uniformity in the arena of maritime commerce by vesting the
lower federal courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. " 41 Because the Constit-
ution does not specify the rules of decision, federal courts have
played a major role in molding the substantive rules that have come
to be known as "general maritime law.142
Problems Concerning Contributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 439 (1979).
36 See generally Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal. Criteria for a Theory
About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S.
McDougal. Jurisprudence in a Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 486
(1967).
37 Marc S. Firestone, Problems in the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Damage
Caused in Outer Space. 59 TU.L. REV. 747, 774-75 (1985).
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. cl. 1.
39 Id.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2003).
41 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77; see also Harrington Putnam, How
the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 468-
69 (1925).
42 Robert Force, Choice of Law in Admiralty Cases: "National Interests" and the
Admiralty Clause, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1431 n.70 (2001) (citing E. River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-75 (1986) (creating a
maritime law of products liability); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375, 397-403 (1970) (creating a maritime wrongful-death remedy)).
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The Supreme Court has long construed the admiralty clause
of the U.S. Constitution as vesting federal courts with jurisdiction
over all maritime contracts and torts.43 Although the admiralty clause
was originally limited to commerce involving "the sea," the clause
soon gave rise to suits involving all navigable waters. Accordingly, if
a tort cause of action sounds in admiralty, the admiralty side of the
federal district courts will have original subject matter jurisdiction
over that matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1333.44
Because most maritime cases are litigated in federal courts,
there is a widespread misconception that admiralty jurisprudence is
of exclusive concern to the federal judiciary. However, numerous
maritime torts are equally adjudicable in state courts.45 This can be
achieved by way of the "savings to suitors clause" of 28 U.S.C. §1333,
which "leave[s] state courts competent to adjudicate maritime causes
of action in proceedings in personam, that is, where the defendant is a
person [or entity], not a ship or some other instrument of naviga-
tion."46 Thus, "[o]rdinarily, where plaintiffs seek monetary damages
for tort or contract claims that fall within admiralty jurisdiction,
43 Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction. Airplanes and Wrongful Death in Territorial
Waters. 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084, 1086 n.17 (1964) (citing Delovio v. Boit, et al., 7
Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C. Mass. 1815)).
44 Id at 1086. It bears mentioning that there are a number of federal statutes
providing that certain maritime claims can be brought on the "law side" of the
federal district courts, i.e., the side where litigants are entitled to a jury trial and
proceedings are governed by traditional rules of procedure. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C.
30104(a) (2007) (stating that "seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with
the right of trial by jury. against the employer"). Likewise, jurisdiction on the "law
side" of federal courts can also be proper pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., Saroza v. Royal Caribbean Corp., No. CV 91-
0917, 1991 WL 341356 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1991). However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has expressly disapproved of the notion that all claims brought pursuant to the
common law of admiralty should be cognizable on both the admiralty and law sides
of federal courts because they essentially "arise under" the laws of the United States
or the Constitution for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 380 (1959).
45 See, e.g., Cruise Ships & Catering Servs. Int'l, N.V. v. Tananta, 823 So. 2d 258
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
46 Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1953) (internal quotations
omitted); cf Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1878) ("[A] proceeding in rem is
one taken directly against property, and has for its object the disposition of the
property. without reference to the title of individual claimants.") (emphasis retained
in original).
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plaintiffs have a choice of bringing a suit in admiralty in federal court
or of bringing suit in state court.147
Given that in personam maritime tort claims can be brought in
state or federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1333, the critical issue for
practitioners becomes whether or not a particular tort claim qualifies
as a maritime tort and is therefore subject to admiralty jurisdiction.
On the surface, this inquiry appears to be purely jurisdictional in
nature (i.e., if a claim for relief is a "maritime claim," then § 1333 can
be invoked to bestow jurisdiction on a federal or state court; if not,
then there must be an independent basis for jurisdiction). In reality,
however, this determination informs various aspects of the proceed-
ings, including the applicable rules of procedure, 48 the right to a jury
trial,49 and most importantly for the purposes of this article, choice of
law.50
Traditionally, tort claims were considered maritime torts for
purposes of admiralty jurisdiction only if: (1) the tort occurred on
navigable waters; and (2) the resultant injury was "wholly" sustained
on navigable waters. 51 If both prongs of this locality inquiry were
satisfied, then admiralty jurisdiction was proper; if not, courts would
require some independent basis for the retention of jurisdiction.52
This rigid locus-based rule was modified by Congressional
statute in 1948 with the passage of the Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act,53 which has since been re-codified at 46 U.S.C. §
47 1 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 1:8 (5th ed. 2003).
48 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h), 14(c), 38(e), and 82.
49 In federal court, the right to a jury trial in a maritime tort suit is determined by
whether the claim is brought on the "law side" or the "admiralty side." Crookham v.
Muick, 246 F. Supp. 288, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (noting that right to jury trial which
the Jones Act makes available if seaman elects to sue on "law side" is not available if
action is brought on the "admiralty side"). However. "[w]hen a maritime matter is
brought in state court, there may be trial by july (depending upon state law) ......
FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, Admiralty in a Nutshell § XIX.B (5th
ed. 2005).
50 If the tort is maritime for jurisdictional purposes, maritime substantive law applies.
See, e.g., In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 277 n.27 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. dism'd, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
51 See John B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531-
32 (1995).
52 See, e.g., The Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20 (1865).
53 Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified as
46 U.S.C. § 740).
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30101.54 The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act provides that
"[tihe admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
extends to and includes cases of injury or damage, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the
injury or damage is done or consummated on land."55 This modifica-
tion was intended to "end concern over the sometimes confusing line
between land and water, by investing admiralty jurisdiction over 'all
cases' where the injury was caused by a ship or other vessel on navig-
able water[s], even if such injury occurred on land."56 Thus, in one fell
swoop, Congress hoped to put to rest the uncompromising rigidity of
the former rule and eliminate an increasing number of impractical
and illogical rulings, such as the "non-maritime" classification of tort
claims arising out of a ship's collision with a pier.57
While this expansion of admiralty jurisdiction initially served
its purpose insofar as it brought certain hybrid cases within the
jurisdiction of the nation's admiralty courts - both state and federal -
its ultimate effect was more inclusive than originally intended, and
certain classes of cases had to be excluded from its purview by
judicial fiat.58 This was accomplished over a span of thirty years in a
well-known trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases that
narrowed the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) with a two-part test design-
ed to reveal whether a particular claim bears a sufficient connection
to traditional maritime activity to be classified as a "maritime tort."59
This two-part "locus-nexus" test is applied summarily by
admiralty judges at the outset of a case60 and requires that tort claims
54 Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. 109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1509
(2006).
55 Id.
56 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 532 (internal citations omitted).
57 Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191, 197 (1911) (concluding that tort claim arising out of
ship's collision with pier did not satisfy traditional locality test because pier was
considered extension of land).
58 See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 260 (1972).
59 See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S.
668 (1982); Sisson v. Ruby. 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
60 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 537-38 (stating that "[n]ormal practice permits a party to
establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of
jurisdictional elements . . . and any litigation of a contested subject-matter
jurisdictional fact issue occurs in a comparatively summary procedure before a judge
alone... ") (citation omitted)).
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"satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime
activity" to be considered "maritime torts."61 The location prong
requires courts to "determine whether the tort occurred on navigable
water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on
navigable water."62 The second prong, often referred to as the
"[m]aritime nexus requirement[,] . . . is satisfied by demonstrating
that (1) the incident has 'a potentially disruptive impact on maritime
commerce,' and (2) that 'the general character' of the 'activity giving
rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity.' ' 63
IV. CURRENT MARITIME CHOICE OF LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
Once both prongs of the maritime tort test are satisfied and
jurisdiction is properly vested pursuant to § 1333 or some other
federal statute,64 the maritime choice of law analysis begins in
earnest.
Maritime torts are subject to the application of "substantive
admiralty law,"65 which was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as
"an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those
rules, and newly created rules."66 This holds true whether the claims
are initiated in federal or state court; consequently, state courts often
apply federal common law in cases brought pursuant to the "saving
61 Id. at 534.
62 Id. (citation omitted).
63 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 1:17 (5th ed. 2003)
(quoting Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534).
64 Jurisdiction may also be proper on the "law side" of a federal district court
pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006). and/or
the federal question jurisdiction statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). Regardless of the
basis for jurisdiction, however, once a tort claim is determined to be a "maritime
tort," the same maritime choice of law analysis applies. See, e.g., Romero, 358 U.S.
at 379-81 (applying maritime common law choice of law analysis to Jones Act
claims initiated pursuant to federal question jurisdiction); Saroza v. Royal Caribbean
Corp.. 1992 A.M.C. 428, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (applying maritime common law
choice of law analysis to Jones Act claim initiated in federal court pursuant to both
admiralty and diversity jurisdiction statutes).
65 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 545 (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).
66 East River. 476 U.S. at 864-65.
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to suitors" clause of § 1331 - a counterintuitive phenomenon com-
monly referred to as the "Reverse Erie" doctrine. 67
However, though maritime torts are subject to substantive
admiralty law once they are properly labeled as such, this does not
ipso facto result in all maritime torts being governed by federal rules
of decision. In fact, it is a "fundamental feature of admiralty law" that
all maritime torts are subject to a maritime choice of law analysis, 68
which can sometimes result in the application of state69 or foreign
law 70 to the claims at issue.
TOWARD A RISING TIDE OF CHOICE OF LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
The U.S. Supreme Court has supplied a rich choice of law
jurisprudence in the context of maritime torts beginning with the
seminal case of Lauritzen v. Larsen,71 continuing with Romero v. Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co., 72 and concluding with Hellenic Lines
Ltd. v. Rhoditis.73
In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman sued the Danish owner of the
Randa, a Danish vessel, in the Southern District of New York, under
the Jones Act 74 for negligent injuries suffered in the course of his
employment aboard the Randa while it was in a harbor in Havana,
Cuba. 75 The seaman was temporarily in New York when he joined
the crew of the Randa, which was registered in Denmark and flew
under the Danish flag. 76 The seaman had signed a contract, written in
Danish, which stated that the rights of crew members would be
67 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NoRRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 1:10 (5th ed. 2003)
(internal citation omitted).
68 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 545-46 (citations omitted).
69 See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
70 See, e.g., Warn v. M/Y Maridome, 169 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 1999); Tarasenko v.
Cardigan Shipping Co.. Ltd., 671 F. Supp. 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Bautista v. Cruise
Ships Catering and Servs. Int'l, N.V., 350 F. Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Solano
v. Gulf King 55, Inc.. 212 F.3d 902 (5th Cir. 2000).
71 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
72 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
73 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
74 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1975) (current version at 46 App. U.S.C.A. § 688 (2006)).




determined by Danish law and the Danish Seamen's Union, of which
the plaintiff was a member.77 The Court awarded a verdict of
$4,267.50.78 The Second Circuit affirmed. 79
In this pre-Bremen case, the Supreme Court began with an
exercise in interest analytics, comparing the provisions and purposes
of U.S. and Danish law, rather than treating the contractual choice of
law clause as dispositive. 80 The Court noted that both legal systems
provided the injured seaman with rights to maintenance and cure at
the shipowner's expense irrespective of fault or negligence of either
party.81 However, there were sharp distinctions between the Danish
and American laws. In Denmark, ill or injured seafarers only had
twelve weeks in which to bring suit against the shipowner, while the
U.S. law only "limit[ed] this to the period within which maximum
possible cure can be effected."82 There were also differences as to the
funding source for the remedies.83
The injured seafarer argued that "[i]t makes no explicit
requirement that either the seaman, the employment or the injury
have the slightest connection with the United States .... All alien
seafaring men injured anywhere in the world" may bring suit in the
United States under the Jones Act, including 'a hand on a Chinese
junk, never outside Chinese waters."' 84 The Supreme Court
disagreed.85 Couching its decision in a newly devised multi-factor
framework designed to serve as a proxy for interest analytics, the
Supreme Court held that the Jones Act should not be interpreted to
apply to foreigners for acts committed outside the dominion of the
sovereignty exerting the power. 86
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. (citing Larsen v. Lauritzen, 196 F.2d 220 (2nd Cir. 1952)).
80 The Lauritien Court did not explain why it denied the choice of law provision's
dispositive significance. However, Lauritien was decided prior to Bremen and Shute,
which established the presumptive enforceability of choice of law and choice of
forum provisions in maritime agreements.81 Id. at 575.
82 Id. (citing Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949)).
83 See id. at 576.
84 Id. at 576-77 (internal quotations omitted).
85 See id. at 578.
86 See id. ("That is a rule based on international law, by which one sovereign power
is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside
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Thus, in the wake of Lauritzen, the first principle of
"substantive admiralty law" to be applied in every maritime tort case
is not a rule of decision, but a choice of law determination. Pursuant
to the framework first articulated in Lauritzen - now commonly
known as the Lauritzen-Rhoditis framework - courts reviewing mari-
time tort claims analyze eight different factors to determine the appli-
cable law: (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the ship's
flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) the allegiance of
the shipowner; (5) the place of contracting; (6) the accessibility of any
alternative forum; (7) the law of the forum; and (8) the shipowner's
base of operations and ownership composition. 87 While some factors
weigh more heavily than others (e.g., courts give great weight to the
law of the flag 88 and the allegiance of the claimant),89 the framework
is neither formulaic nor exhaustive.90 The result has been a panoply
of decisions pointing in different directions and leaving little predict-
ability for today's practitioners, especially when the factors are
incongruous.
V. DRAFTING FOR NAUGHT: THE
(IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES
IN MARITIME TORTS
Because practitioners prize predictability, rolling the dice is
not a viable solution to the uncertainty that inevitably pervades the
jurisprudence of multi-factor frameworks. This lack of predictability
is particularly pronounced in maritime tort cases involving foreign
seafarers, since the law and accessibility of their home fora are not
readily determinable. 91 Take, for example, a slip and fall in Mexican
its own territory.") (quoting Lord Russell of Killowen in The Queen v. Jameson,
(1896) 2 Q.B. 425, 430)).
87 Id. at 583-91; Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970).
88 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584 (noting that the law of the flag is of "cardinal import-
ance" and is considered "[p]erhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime
law").
89 Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc.. 776 F.2d 1512, 1517 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985)
(indicating that allegiance of claimant is "especially significant in the choice-of-law
analysis") (citing Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 467 (5th Cir.
1966)); see also Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 586.
90 See Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309.
91 See, e.g., Symonette Shipyards. Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 468 n.5 (5th Cir.
1966) (noting that the Lauritzen analysis was complicated by the fact that "no body
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waters involving a Bahamian crewmember who, while in New York,
signed onto a Greek-owned and operated vessel flying a Liberian flag
of convenience. 92 Under the Lauritzen-Rhoditis analysis, the rules of
decision of five nations (i.e., Bahamas, Greece, Liberia, Mexico, U.S.)
could potentially apply with little guidance as to which should
properly rule the day.
Thus, in order to add a degree of certainty to the historically
murky and sometimes dispositive 93 choice of law issues surrounding
maritime torts, shipowners and masters have uniformly included
choice of law provisions in shipping articles signed by their employ-
ees. 94 In fact, the shipping articles in Lauritzen,95 Romero,96 and
Rhoditis97 all contained choice of law provisions, at least one of which
expressly encompassed all rights of the crewmember - not just
contractual claims. 98 And even though the Court was well-aware of
these choice of law provisions and acknowledged that there is "no
public policy that would prevent the parties ... from so settling upon
of reported decisions of Bahamian cases exists and that the only source of Bahamian
case law is found in the knowledge and memory of local practitioners").
92 Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre, 340 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that a vessel's
flag will be classified as a "flag of convenience" if the "foreign registration is only
nominal and the vessel belongs to the nation of the flag it flies only for the purpose
of avoiding shipping laws of the United States").
93 Where foreign law is held to apply. cases have been disposed of on the grounds of
forum non conveniens, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or failure to state a claim.
See, e.g., Warn v. M/Y Maridome, 169 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that where
court's choice of law analysis indicates that foreign law is applicable to claims,
court's order will be treated, on appeal, as dismissal for failure to state a claim);
Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc., 776 F.2d 1512 (affirming dismissal of Jones Act
claim on forum non conveniens grounds because of applicability of foreign law);
Rodriguez v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana. S.A., 703 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1983)
(dismissing Jones Act claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of
applicability of foreign law).
94 Shipping articles are contracts of employment between masters and seafarers. See
The Seatrain New Orleans, 127 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1942).
95 345 U.S. at 588 (noting that "contract was explicit that the Danish law . . .
control[led]").
96 142 F. Supp. at 573 (D.C.N.Y. 1956) (noting that seafarer submitted to Spanish
laws and regulations).
97 398 U.S. at 308.
98 345 U.S. at 573 (noting that shipping articles provided that the "rights of crew
members would be governed by Danish law").
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the law of the flag-state as their governing code,"99 the decisions
seemingly glossed over these clauses, forcing square pegs into round
holes by deeming choice of law provisions mere sub-factors for
consideration under the rubric of the "place of contract" factor - a
factor that has been repeatedly discounted as "fortuitous" and not
warranting "substantial influence in the choice between competing
laws to govern a maritime tort."1 00 Furthermore, while the Lauritzen
and Romero decisions ultimately applied the law specified in the
seafarers' shipping articles,1 01 the Rhoditis court did the exact oppos-
ite, considering the eight factors and disregarding the choice of law
provision with little explanation, thus draping a shroud of mystery
over the role, if any, of choice of law provisions in the Lauritzen-
Rhoditis analysis. 10 2
VI. THE ROLE OF CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS
IN MARITIME TORTS POST-BREMEN
But alas, the Lauritzen, Romero, and Rhoditis decisions were all
handed down prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,103 a case that revolutionized the interp-
retation and enforceability of maritime contracts, as well as the
course curricula of law school jurisdiction courses.
In Bremen, the parties entered into a rig towage agreement
which included a forum selection clause selecting London, England
as the exclusive forum for disputes arising out of the agreement. 10 4
When severe weather damaged the rig, the towing party brought it to
Tampa, Florida, the nearest port of refuge, where the U.S. Marshals
had been given advance notice and promptly arrested the boat in
port.10 5 The customer followed-up by bringing suit against the
towing company in admiralty.10 6 The towing party moved to dismiss
" Id. at 589.
100 Id. at 588-89.
101 Id. at 592; Romero. 358 U.S. at 383-84.
102 See Rhoditis. 308 U.S. at 308-09.
103 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
104 Id. at 2.
105 Id. at 3-4 n.3.
106 Id. at 3-4.
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the case, citing the mandatory forum selection clause in the towage
agreement. 107
Citing cases that viewed forum selection clauses unfavorably,
the District Court denied the motion to dismiss, treating the motion
as having been made pursuant to forum non conveniens, the doctrine
that would ordinarily apply in the absence of a clause. 10 8 The District
Court concluded the balance of conveniences was not strongly in
favor of the defendant and that the plaintiff's choice of forum should
not be disturbed in spite of the unambiguous and freely bargained-
for forum selection clause.10 9 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding
that parties cannot contractually "oust the jurisdiction of the [federal
admiralty] courts."110
In a seminal eight to one decision that forever changed the
interpretation of maritime agreements, the Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit Court, holding that the forum selection clause at
issue was enforceable.1 11 The Court concluded that a "freely negotiat-
ed private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power ... should be given full
effect" and that the enforcement of such clauses "accords with ancient
concepts of freedom of contract."1 12
Taking the Court's reasoning one step further, it seems logical
that - like forum selection provisions - choice of law provisions
appearing in freely negotiated private international agreements
unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power would also be given full effect. In fact, some commentators
and courts have come to precisely this conclusion. For example,
Professor Thomas J. Schoenbaum notes in his admiralty and maritime
law treatise that "American courts will enforce choice of forum
clauses (and by implication choice of law clauses) contractually
agreed upon by parties dealing at arms length and in good faith."1 13
Likewise, various federal appeals courts reviewing maritime tort
107 Id. at 4.
108 Id. at 6.
109 Id. at 1911.110 Id. at 7.
111 Id. at 12-13.
112/I. at 11-13.
113 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 21-15 (4th ed.
2001).
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claims have indicated that "where the parties specify in their
contractual agreement which law will apply, admiralty courts will
generally give effect to that choice."1 14
Despite these logical interpretations of Bremen by courts and
commentators, the majority of American courts faced with presump-
tively valid choice of law clauses in maritime tort cases remain
hesitant to give these clauses disposiive effect and continue to apply
the Lauritzen-Rhoditis framework in the absence of a more specific
directive from the U.S. Supreme Court.115
The post-Bremen case of Tarsenko v. Cardigan Shipping Co.
epitomizes the challenges lower courts face in this context.1 16 In
Tarasenko, a Norwegian seafarer domiciled in Miami, Florida signed
onto a Bahamian-flagged vessel.117 While serving aboard the vessel in
1985, the seafarer suffered personal injuries not far from the coast of
Spain.118 When the foreign seafarer brought suit against his employer
in New York, the employer sought to have the case dismissed for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the existence of an unambiguous
Norwegian choice of law clause in the employment agreement. 119
Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bremen, Judge
Pollack of the Southern District of New York observed that "[tihe
existence of a clause in the employment agreement specifying
Norwegian law to govern the rights and obligations of the plaintiff
expresses the intent of the parties . . . [and] is generally binding."1 20
Despite this forceful language regarding the enforceability of choice
114 Chan v. Society Expeditions. Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1997); see
also Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 198 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting
that "a reasonable choice of law clause whose operation does not contradict a strong
public policy of the United States . . . would typically be enforced under federal
maritime law"). But see Thomas v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 2009 WL 1874098 (1 1th
Cir., July. 1, 2009) (questioning enforceability of agreements in which choice of law
and choice of forum provisions operate as a prospective waiver of statutory rights).
115 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional De Marineros De Hond., 372 U.S. 10 (1963);
Windward Shipping (London), Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974);
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U. S. Dist. Court, S. D. Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.. 486 U.S. 140 (1988); Spector v.
Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
116 Tarasenko v. Cardigan Shipping Co., 671 F. Supp. 997, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See id at 999.
120 Id. (citing Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
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of law clauses in maritime agreements, Judge Pollack felt compelled
to apply all eight Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors before concluding that
Norwegian law governed the plaintiff's claims, and that dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. 121
The California case of Lockwood vs. M/S Royal Viking Star is
similarly confusing in its treatment of a choice of law clause in a
maritime tort case. 122 In Lockwood, an American seafarer was injured
aboard a Norwegian ship in Hong Kong.123 The seafarer sued the
shipowner in the Central District of California for his personal
injuries, asserting various causes of action under the Jones Act and
the general maritime laws of the United States. 124 Pointing to the
choice of law provision in the contract, the shipowner maintained
that the claims should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction because Norwegian law governed.125 Meanwhile, the seafarer
argued that American law should apply pursuant to the Lauritzen-
Rhoditis analysis, and claimed "to have been unaware of the choice of
law in his employment contract.1 26
Siding with the shipowner, the Court found the choice of law
provision presumptively valid, noting that the seafarer "had on a
prior occasion signed an identical contract" with the same provision
stipulating "that Norwegian law will apply."127 And yet - despite this
finding of presumptive validity - the Court went on to engage in a
full-blown Lauritzen-Rhoditis analysis, treating the choice of law
provision as a mere sub-factor within the "Place of Contract" factor.128
Interestingly, the Lockwood court did not explain why a
Lauritzen-Rhoditis analysis was even necessary in the wake of Bremen,
given the presumptively valid and unambiguous Norwegian choice
of law clause. Ultimately, however, the distinction was incon-
sequential, for the Lauritzen-Rhoditis analysis yielded the same result
121 See Tarasenko, 671 F. Supp. 997, 999-1000.
122 See generally Lockwood v. The M/S Royal Viking Star, 663 F. Supp. 181 (C.D.
Cal. 1986).
123 Id. at 181.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 183-84.
126 Id. at 183.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 181-83.
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as was called for by the choice of law provision, and the seafarers
claims were dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 129
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rapid globalization, advancements in technology, and
pioneered methods in ship engineering have both revolutionized the
modern notion of sea travel and globalized international maritime
relationships. The challenge is for the jurisprudence to keep pace.
Despite the eloquent opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Lauritzen-Rhoditis trilogy, there remains an atmosphere of uncertainty
in matters involving choice of law clauses. 130 After a lengthy hiatus,
there is a dire need for the Court to plot the chart through the straits
of competing principles, customs, and interests to settle the often
volatile ebb and flow of tort litigation in admiralty. 131
A clear resolution as to the appropriate role of choice of law
clauses in this context will enable courts - both state and federal - to
narrow their inquiries. As Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu acknowl-
edged, "Those who have knowledge, don't predict. Those who
predict, don't have knowledge." The majority decision in Bremen
quieted concerns over the enforceability of forum selection clauses by
honoring the concentrated efforts of parties to a contract to select
forums to handle potential disputes. 132 As a consequence, parties and
courts are able to tackle choice of forum questions quickly and
efficiently in the presence of an otherwise enforceable clause.
129 Id. at 184.
130 See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970) (holding that
American maritime law applied despite presence of choice of law clause).
131 In non-maritime matters, for example. courts are directed to apply choice of law
clauses so long as the selected law has some relation to the suit and is not purely
arbitrary.
132 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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In the choice of law context, however, the waters are much
murkier. The current state of the Lauritzen-Rhoditis analysis can un-
necessarily subject shipowners and maritime employers to unpredict-
able litigation outcomes, despite cautiously crafted contracts that
seek to settle decisions about the law to be utilized in dispute reso-
lution. Though the law favoring enforcement of the parties' intentions
seems clear in the wake of Bremen, maritime employers and seamen
alike would benefit if the Supreme Court were to issue a clear direct-
ive on these matters. While Eleanor Roosevelt may have been right
when she declared "if life were predictable it would cease to be life,
and be without flavor," the law is quite the opposite; pass the
Wonder bread please.., no butter.

